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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2006, Missouri teenager Megan Meier committed suicide.' A
year later, the thirteen-year-old's parents reported that Megan hanged herself
due to a prank played by their forty-seven-year-old neighbor, Lori Drew, on
MySpace.com.2 The small town tragedy was dubbed the "MySpace Suicide
Hoax."' Drew created a MySpace profile for a fictional boy named Josh Evans
with the intention of discovering whether Megan spread rumors about her
daughter.' Over the course of two hours on the night of Megan's suicide-in an
incident prompted by the fake profile-Megan was the target of intense har-
assment.5 Described as "a teenage mob on the Web," the attack spread rumors
that Megan was fat, a slut, and that no one should befriend her.6 Later that
night, Megan's parents found her body hanging in her bedroom closet.7 The
local and national television news and talk radio shows broadcast the story, and
bloggers wrote about it.' Tamara Jones, staff writer for the Washington Post,
t J.D. and Communications Law Studies Certificate Candidate, May 2009, The Catho-
lic University of America, Columbus School of Law. A special thanks to Steve Klitzman
and Karen Duquette for their guidance and assistance in the development of this Comment.
I Lauren Collins, Friend Game: Behind the MySpace Suicide, NEW YORKER, Jan. 21,
2008, at 34.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 TheSmokingGun.com, Megan Meier Police Reports: Cops Chronicle MySpace Hoax
that Ended in 13-Year-Old's Suicide, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2007/
1120072meganl .html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (providing background information and the
actual police reports).
5 See Tamara Jones, A Deadly Web ofDeceit, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2008, at Cl.
6 Id.
7 TheSmokingGun.com, supra note 4 (providing the St. Charles County Sheriff's De-
partment report for the incident).
8 See Jones, supra note 5 ("The troubling story was picked up by bloggers, talk radio
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described the effect of Megan's death on the Internet community: "Tens of
thousands joined the ongoing debate. Some wanted legislation; others wanted
blood. On message boards and Web site memorials, in chats and forums,
Megan would be mourned, analyzed, romanticized, vilified and endlessly dis-
cussed, giving her death the popularity she never knew in life."9
Over the next few months, the FBI investigated the Drew family's involve-
ment in the incident. ° The U.S. Attorney's Office and the St. Charles County,
Missouri prosecutor initially decided that charges could not be filed against
Lori Drew, her family, or their family friend, Ashley Grills, who participated
in the prank." The prosecutors determined that "no statutes against harassment,
stalking or child endangerment could be applied here. What happened to
Megan was despicable ... but for it to be considered criminal the state would
have to prove that the hoax was intended to frighten or disturb Megan, not
merely elicit information."' 2
However, on May 15, 2008, Lori Drew was indicted for her role in the
MySpace suicide hoax on one count of conspiracy and three counts of com-
puter fraud under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.3 This was the first time
that a federal statute that applies to accessing protected computers was used for
a social-networking case." Although the government previously has filed
charges against computer hackers under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
the statute has never been used to prosecute a cyberharasser 5 In July 2008,
representatives for Drew challenged the prosecution's use of the statute and
filed a motion to dismiss. 6 Consistent with what some legal experts argue, the
prosecution's use of the statute undermines the intent of the law-to punish
and deter hackers from breaking into computer systems to steal private infor-
mation. 7 While a great effort is being made to bring to justice those whose
harassment led to Megan Meier's death, without a specific statute in place that
penalizes cyberharassment, punishing those responsible likely will prove un-
successful.
Megan's story is just one illustration of the potentially drastic consequences
and other in the indignant chat universe.").
9 Jones, supra note 5.
10 Id.
" Id. Drew sometimes dictated to Ashley Grills the messages from the fictional boy. Id.
12 Id.
13 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
14 Linda Deutsch, Teen's Neighbor Charged in Death, WASH. POST, May 16, 2008, at
C3.
1 See id
16 Peter Whoriskey, Woman Accused in MySpace Suicide Case Seeks to Have All
Charges Dismissed, WASH. POST, July 24, 2008 at DI.
17 See Editorial, Falsehoods on MySpace, WASH. POST, May 26, 2008, at A16; see also
Whoriskey, supra note 16.
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of cyberharassment. Commonly classified as a misdemeanor in most states,
traditional harassment statutes have no applicable law or punishment for viola-
tors in cyberspace.'8 However, many states, including Missouri, either have
enacted criminal laws against cyberharassment or established task forces to
create such laws. 9 The Federal Government is recognizing slowly the growing
problem," but Congress has not yet enacted a criminal law punishing cyber-
harassment. Still, legislators realize that existing federal laws that address tra-
ditional forms of harassment either are too broad or too narrow and essentially
ineffective.2' If the law is too broad, it threatens to chill forms of speech and
potentially violate the First Amendment.2 If too narrow, a statute will not pro-
vide relief for a victim of cyberharassment because Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),23
18 See Harry A. Valetk, Cyberstalking: Navigating a Maze of Laws, 228 N.Y.L.J., July
23, 2002 at 5.
19 Id. ("At last count, 41 states ... had laws expressly prohibiting harassing conduct
through the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic means."). On June 30, 2008, the Governor of
Missouri, Matt Blunt, signed a bill that outlawed cyberharassment. Press Release, Missouri
Governor Matt Blunt, Gov. Blunt Enacts Legislation to Safeguard Missourians from Internet
Harassment (June 30, 2008), available at http://governor.mo.gov/press June2008.htm (fol-
low hyperlink of title). The measure broadened Missouri harassment law to include, in addi-
tion to harassment that is written or communicated over the phone, harassment over com-
puters, text messages, and various electronic devices. See Associated Press, Mo. Governor
Signs Anti-Cyberbullying Bill into Law, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, July 1, 2008, http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20245.
20 On May 22, 2008, U.S. Representatives Kenny Hulshof (R-Mo.) and Linda Sanchez
(D-Ca.) introduced H.R. 6123, The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, which
would amend Title 18 of the U.S. Code to include federal penalties for cyberharassment. See
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. sec. 3 (2008); see also
Mo. Governor Signs Anti-Cyberbullying Bill into Law, supra note 19. The legislation states
§ 881. Cyberbullying
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with
the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a
person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) the term 'communication' means the electronic transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received; and
(2) the term 'electronic means' means any equipment dependent on electrical
power to access an information service, including email, instant messaging, blogs,
websites, telephones, and text messages.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 41 of title
18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
"881. Cyberbullying."
Id.
21 See infra Part IV.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... "). See infra Part IV.B.
23 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
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cannot be held liable for the actions of third parties on their servers.24
In an increasingly digital world, as a person's privacy and reputation be-
come more vulnerable to corruption, and anonymity via the Internet becomes
more feasible, cyberharassment likely will increase and a federal law to curb or
punish it will be necessary. However, the First Amendment right to free speech
and the relative lack of government regulation of the Internet25 stand as sub-
stantial obstacles to overcome to protect the privacy and reputation of indi-
viduals online.
This Comment discusses how cyberharassment, illustrated by the suicide of
Megan Meier, is a serious threat to public safety. To mitigate the threat, this
Comment proposes legislation criminalizing cyberharassment. Part II of this
Comment defines cyberharassment and describes characteristics of the Internet
that serve as cyberharassment facilitators. Part III discusses recent examples of
cyberharassment, both intentional and unintentional, and the concerns these
incidents raise about the protection of personal privacy and reputation. Part IV
analyzes and critiques current federal law and commentary related to cyberhar-
assment and the impact of existing laws on cyberharassment. Part V discusses
and analyzes existing state laws and other policies that address cyberharass-
ment and proposes sample legislation that would make cyberharassment a
crime without violating the First Amendment. Enactment of a federal statute
will ensure consistent prosecution of cyberharassers and proper relief for their
victims while encouraging greater public safety on the Internet.
II. CYBERHARASSMENT: AN EXISTING PROBLEM AGGRAVATED
BY NEW TECHNOLOGY
26
A. Definition
Since Megan Meier's suicide, harassment over electronic mediums is the
24 For an in depth discussion of the Communications Decency Act, see infra Part IV.
25 Some regulations, primarily in the area of child protection laws, affect the Internet.
See Children Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2006). Generally, how-
ever, the United States has adopted a hands-off approach to Internet regulation. See Kevin
A. Meehan, The Continuing Conundrum of International Internet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 345, 354 (2008) (explaining that a model of Internet regulation-the
neo-mercantilism model-where the role of government "is to ensure the free flow of com-
merce along the information superhighway and to remove any impediments" is known as
the "American approach to Internet regulation").
26 Language taken from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 1999
REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY(1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm [hereinafter 1999 DOJ
REPORT].
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subject of increased debate. 27 Harassment in its traditional offline form is de-
fined as "words, conduct, or action ... that ... annoys, alarms, or causes sub-
stantial emotional stress in [the] person and serves no legitimate purpose." '28
Computers add another dimension to this definition and increase opportunities
for online persecutors to harass their victims.2 The ease with which a person
can use e-mail or create a blog," for example, facilitates the ability of harassers
to assail their victims either in the home or in the workplace.3 Additionally, if
the harasser so chooses, he can remain anonymous, creating an even greater
sense of unease for his victim.32
Although cyberharassment has no universal definition,33 it typically occurs
when an individual or group with no legitimate purpose uses a form of elec-
tronic communication as a means to cause great emotional distress to a per-
son.34 In addition to e-mail and blogs, conduits of "new media"35 available to
the cyberharasser include chat rooms, instant messaging services, electronic
bulletin boards,36 and social networking sites." The Internet provides cyberhar-
27 See Chris Blank, Mo. Teen's Suicide Inspires Bill, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Jan29/0,4670,IntemetSuicide,00.html.
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 733 (8th ed. 2004).
29 Paul Cullen, Computer Crime, in LAW AND THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE
207, 217 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 1997) ("[C]omputers can provide a
powerful tool for the criminally minded.").
30 See DANIEL J. SOLOvE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET 20 (2007). The author commented
All you need to do is go to one of the popular blogging websites, and you can set up an
account for free (or at most, a few bucks per month). Some popular blogging websites
include Blogger or Typepad. To set up your blog, you merely need to choose a name
for it and a template for its look and style. In less that three minutes, you'll become a
blogger, and with the click of a mouse, you can broadcast your thoughts live to the en-
tire planet.
Id.
31 See Cullen, supra note 29, at 217.
32 Id.
33 See Valetk, supra note 18; 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26.
34 See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 953 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla.
2007).
35 Eileen M. Alexy et al., Perceptions of Cyberstalking Among College Students, 5
BRIEF TREATMENT AND CRISIS INTERVENTION J. 279, 279 (2005) (referring to the "the emer-
gence of communication technologies" as "new media").
36 A bulletin board system, synonymous with a message board, is "an electronic mes-
sage system running on a microcomputer. Call up, leave messages, read messages. The sys-
tem is like a physical bulletin board .... Some people call bulletin board systems electronic
mail systems." HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 179 (22d ed. 2006).
37 David Harvey, Cyberstalking and Internet Harassment: What the Law Can Do,
DAVID HARVEY, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, NETSAFE.ORG.NZ 2 (2003), http://
www.netsafe.org.nz/Doc Library/netsafepapers-davidharveycyberstalking.pdf. Popular
social networking sites include MySpace, Facebook, and Friendster. MySpace.com, About
Us, http://www.myspace.com (follow "About" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2008); Face-
book.com, About Facebook, http//www.facebook.com/facebook (last visited Oct. 25, 2008);
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assers with an easy channel to "incite others against their victims."3 Not only
can the cyberharasser harass his victim, but he can also impersonate the victim
and post defamatory messages on bulletin boards, cyberbully his victim, or
send vulgar e-mails to the victim's employer.39 The victim suffers as a result of
actions committed by the cyberharasser."
One problem that often arises with the definition of cyberharassment is the
interchangeable and synonymous use of the terms "cyberharassment," "cyber-
stalking," and "cyberbullying." Although the terms are similar, each is subtly
distinct. The difference between cyberharassment and cyberstalking usually
turns on a perpetrator's objective and motive for his behavior.4 Cyberharass-
ment is defined by a perpetrator's "desire to frighten or embarrass the harass-
ment victim."42 Cyberstalking is characterized as a perpetrator relentlessly pur-
suing his victim online, likely in combination with an offline attack.43 Further-
more, a perpetrator's motive can distinguish whether an incident will qualify as
cyberharassment or cyberstalking." Cyberharassers often intend to teach their
victims a lesson or solicit information from them, whereas cyberstalkers find
purpose in revenge, anger, or obsession.45
Cyberbullying refers to "aggressive behavior that is intentional and involves
an imbalance of power or strength" in electronic form.46 Children and youths
commit the majority of cyberbullying, which is characterized as aggressive
behavior aimed to intimidate and induce fear in a victim." It parallels cyber-
harassment in that both terms involve similar actions-both aim to frighten or
Frienstercom, About Friendster, http://www.friendster.com/info/index.php, (last visited
Oct. 25, 2008).
38 Valetk, supra note 18.
39 Id.
40 See id. ("often, the victim is banned from bulletin boards, accused of improper con-
duct, and flooded with threatening messages.").
41 Parry Aftab, Understanding the Cyberharassment Problem, INFO. WEEK, Aug. 23,
2004, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=29116706.
42 Id.
43 Id. There are three types of cyberharassment and cyberstalking situations: (1)
"[o]nline cyberstalking and harassment that stays online;" (2) cyberharassment and cyber-
stalking that initiates online and either ventures offline or encourages a victim to go offline;
and (3) "[o]ffline stalking or harassment that moves online." Wiredsafety.org, Cyberstalking
and Harassment FAQ, http://www.wiredsafety.org/cyberstalking harassment/csh6.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
44 Aftab, supra note 41.
45 See id.
46 Stop Bullying Now!, What Adults Can Do, http://stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/adult/
indexAdult.asp?Area=cyberbullying (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) ("Traditionally, bullying has
involved actions such as hitting or punching (physical bullying), teasing or name-calling
(verbal bullying), or intimidation through gestures or social exclusion.").
47 Cyberbullying most commonly occurs through instant message, chat rooms, e-mails,
and messages posted on Web site bulletin boards. Id.
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embarrass a victim and both involve posting private information about another
person. 8 The main distinction between cyberbullying and cyberharassment has
to do with age group; cyberbullying often refers to cyberharassment committed
by children.49
Many state laws that address cyberharassment, cyberstalking, and cyberbul-
lying combine the three types of cybercrimes in their statutory schemes." Sev-
eral federal legislative initiatives that address cyberharassment, cyberstalking,
and cyberbullying use one term to encompass them all, despite the fact that the
terms have different meanings." The lack of a federal law intensifies the defi-
nitional problem. 2 Until Congress adopts a federal statute, the need for clearly
stated definitions remains. For purposes of this Comment, the term cyberhar-
assment will be used to encompass cyberstalking and cyberbullying.
B. Feasible and Anonymous: Internet Traits that Facilitate Cyberharassment
1. Anonymity in Cyberspace
The nature of the Internet allows information to flow freely and the market-
place of ideas to expand. 3 Contributing to the free flow is a person's ability to
be and remain virtually anonymous. 4 Users can experiment with different per-
sonas, write a blog under a pseudonym,5 or post comments on bulletin boards
48 Aftab, supra note 41. In a 2005 study, of those students who reported being cyberbul-
lied at least twice in two months, 62% reported that they were cyberbullied by another stu-
dent at school, 46% reported that they had been cyberbullied by a friend, and 55% reported
not knowing who had cyberbullied them. Stop Bullying Now!, supra note 46.
49 See STOP Cyberbullying, Telling the Difference Between Flaming, Cyber-Bullying
and Harassment and Cyberstalking, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/pdf/telling the_
differencele.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
50 See, e.g., In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 953 So. 2d 495, 496
(Fla. 2007) (including the definition of harassment in cyberstalking). See also Mo. REV.
STAT. § 565.225.1(6) (2007).
51 See 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26; In re Standard Jury Instructions, 953 So. 2d at
496-97.
52 See Aftab, supra note 41 ("While at least 46 states in the United States have various
types of cyberstalking or harassment laws on the books, there is no U.S. federal cyberstalk-
ing or harassment law . . . .); Valetk, supra note 18 ("Yet, despite the elusive, multi-
jurisdictional nature of cyberstalking, no uniform federal law exists to protect victims or
define ISP liability.").
53 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 17.
54 See id at 139.
55 A blog created under a pseudonym does not include the blogger's real name or iden-
tity and retains the anonymity of the person blogging. See Harvey, supra note 37, at 2-3; see
also SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 139 ("According to a [Pew Internet & American Life Pro-
ject] survey, 55 percent of bloggers use pseudonyms rather than their real identities.").
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without ever disclosing their identities.56 Anonymity on the Internet thereby
enhances traditional free speech and, in turn, promotes the concept of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 7 It allows people to practice eccentricity without risking
damage to their reputation. 8 Furthermore, anonymity on the Internet allows
people to express their ideas and speak freely when they would otherwise fear
to do so." By increasing the opportunity for multiple ideas to exist simultane-
ously, the marketplace of ideas broadens. In theory, a greater number of ideas
leads more quickly to societal truth.' According to scholar Daniel Solove,
Internet anonymity "allows information to flow more freely than ever before.
We can communicate and share ideas in unprecedented ways. These develop-
ments are revolutionizing our self-expression and enhancing our freedom."6
But at what price comes this enhanced freedom? The "revolutionizing" of
our self-expression can result in extreme and undesirable forms of expression.62
The Internet ensures one person's privacy to speak freely while also allowing
an individual to invade the privacy of another. Essentially, the anonymity fos-
tered by the Internet simultaneously preserves and undermines personal pri-
vacy.63
Anonymity on the Internet allows individuals to provide opinions and in-
formation that they might never otherwise divulge, including information that
56 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 139.
57 See id. at 131, 140.
58 Id. at 140. This is not always the case, however. Anonymous eccentricity can, in fact,
have drastic implications. When people disclose their identity on the Internet, the outcome is
not always good. An example of such an instance is Jessica Cutler. As creator of the Wash-
ingtonienne blog, Jessica blogged about her sexual exploits, one of which was with Robert
Steinbuch, a staff attorney for former U.S. Senator Mike DeWine. Id. at 50-52. When an-
other popular Washington, D.C. blog linked to Jessica's blog, it received an exuberant num-
ber of hits. When Jessica attempted to delete her blog, it was already too late. She was ex-
posed and had exposed third parties in her wake, including her sexual partners and her boss.
Id. at 52-53. Although Jessica's tale is ultimately a success story-she exploited the atten-
tion garnering a book deal and a Playboy spread, her actions over the Internet resulted in the
loss of her job and the exposure of those who never sought an interactive outlet. Id. at 54.
59 Id. at 140 ("Without anonymity, some people might not be wiling to express contro-
versial ideas.").
60 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). Jus-
tice Holmes articulated the market place of ideas concept in his dissent:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id.
61 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 17.
62 See Harvey, supra note 37 (noting that anonymity appeals to harassers).
63 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 141 ("[A]nonymity is a form of privacy protection, yet it
can also facilitate privacy violations.").
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is false and harmful to third parties.' As Solove observed in The Future of
Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet: "When people are
less accountable for their conduct, they are more likely to engage in unsavory
acts. When anonymous, people are often much nastier and more uncivil in their
speech. It is easier to say harmful things about others when we don't have to
take responsibility." 5 Due to the easy accessibility and usability of the Intemet,
not only can anonymous individuals partake in "unsavory acts," but groups can
also form against a single target and threaten that person's reputation or per-
sonal safety.'
Long settled law confirms that the First Amendment protects the right to
speak anonymously.67 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme
Court held that First Amendment protection extends to a writer's decision to
speak anonymously: "Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation...
at the hand of an intolerant society."" Accordingly, the constitutional right to
speak anonymously is vigilantly safeguarded.69 However, when anonymity is
used as an advantage to defame and hurt a person in cyberspace, it should not
be similarly protected. A benefit of technological advancement is the ability to
pierce the veil of anonymity if the law requires it.
One dimension of anonymity on the Internet is traceability.7" Current tech-
nology allows otherwise anonymous users to be traced, which ultimately leads
to discovery of the user's identity.7 Tracing a cyberharasser is one method
through which a victim could seek remedy. Additionally, Congress could draft
a federal law that distinguishes between lawful and unlawful anonymity on the
Internet. Solove stated that "the key is for the law to allow the unmasking of
anonymous people when they engage in harmful speech about others."72 How-
ever, the standard for when to trace an anonymous cyberharasser must be high
64 See Harvey, supra note 37, at 3; SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 140.
65 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 140.
66 Id. On the day of her suicide, the same harassment that Megan Meier sought to avoid
when she transferred middle schools targeted her once again when she was "hounded and
publicly humiliated by a teenage mob on the Web, set upon in a virtual Lord of the Cyber-
flies." Jones, supra note 5.
67 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.").
68 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n., 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citation omitted).
69 See id.
70 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 146.
71 Id. at 146-47. An Internet Protocol ("IP") address can be used to trace an anonymous
user on the Internet. Whenever people communicate over the Internet, their IP addresses are
logged with their ISP. The ISP can then, if needed, trace the IP address back to the user. Id.
at 147.
72 Id. at 147.
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in order to not only avoid bad-faith lawsuits, but also to keep intact anonymity
that facilitates the exchange of ideas.73
2. An Invasion of Privacy
Both anonymity and feasibility enabled by the Internet create a challenge to
the traditional understanding of privacy law.74 Traditionally, the concept of
privacy is twofold: people cannot expect privacy if they are in public places,
even when they believe their acts are private.7" Courts determine whether an
incident is private by applying the tort of public disclosure: "There is no liabil-
ity when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the
plaintiff [that] is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity
to facts about the plaintiffs life that are matters of public record . "..."76
Today, information never intended to be public is exposed via the Internet.77
The nature of the exposure not only invades an individual's expectation of pri-
vacy, but it also calls into question the traditional definition of privacy." What
otherwise would be a fleeting memory in the minds of a few bystanders can
now be posted on the Internet and scrutinized extensively and continuously.79
In turn, this scrutiny can rise to the level of cyberharassment.
An example of such an incident involved "gae-ttong-nyue," roughly trans-
lated as "dog-shit-girl."8 A young woman's small dog defecated on a subway
train in South Korea.8 When other passengers asked her to clean the mess up,
she told them to mind their own business.82 An enraged passenger nearby took
pictures of her and posted the pictures on a popular Korean blog.83 Within
73 Id. at 149.
74 Id. at 163 (explaining that traditional privacy law was "binary," focusing on two
"realms," public and private, and that modem technology "poses a severe" challenge to the
binary framework).
75 Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (stating that where a couple,
who had engaged in a romantic embrace that was later published in an issue of Harper's
Bazaar "had voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the view of
any persons who might then be at or near their place of business .... There can be no pri-
vacy in that which is already public." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
77 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 164.
78 Id. at 164-65 ("We often engage in our daily activities in public expecting to be just a
face in the crowd, another ant in the colony.").
79 Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1041-42 (1995).
80 Don Park's Daily Habit, Korean Netizens Attack Dog-Shit-Girl, http://www.
docuverse.com/blog/donpark/2005/06/08/korean-netizens-attack-dog-shit-girl (June 8, 2005,
5:59 EST) (this blog is being migrated to http://donpark.wordpress.com/).
81 Id.
82 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 1; see also Don Park's Daily Habit, supra note 80.
83 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 1; see also Don Park's Daily Habit, supra note 80.
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hours, bloggers labeled her as dog-shit-girl and spread her picture across cy-
berspace.84 They exposed her identity, and others sought information on her
parents and relatives. 5 The story became a national news story in Korea, and
her reputation eventually spread as far as the United States. 6 As a result of the
harassment she suffered, the woman dropped out of her university."
Under the traditional view of privacy, dog-shit-girl could expect no privacy
because she was in public. 8  Her dog defecated on a public train and her actions
following the act were public. However, once another passenger took her pic-
ture, the incident was taken out of context. 9 The nature of the Web allowed the
story to become a widespread headline.9" But for the photo being posted on the
Internet, the event likely would have been an ephemeral memory of her fellow
passengers.' The incident was a public one; however, the woman's public
presence did not give others the right to photograph, ridicule, and post her pri-
vate information on the Internet.
As exhibited by the dog-shit-girl scenario, the expansion of modem technol-
ogy blurs the line of understanding between what is considered public and pri-
vate information. 92 With a cell phone, a person can hold a private phone con-
versation in a public place.93 People also have private conversations in public
that they do not expect or want third parties to hear.94 Modem society's notion
of privacy involves more than the idea that an act executed in public is not pri-
vate.95 Moreover, as in the case of dog-shit-girl, the question arises as to
whether the law protects the exposure of private information related to a public
84 Don Park's Daily Habit, supra note 80.
85 Id.
86 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at I (noting that the posting of the story on Don Park's
blog spread the story to the United States).
87 Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet's Power to Shame,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at D1.
88 Posting of Chuck to Don Park's Daily Habit, Comments, Korean Netizens Attack
Dog-Shit-Girl, http://www.docuverse.com/blog/donpark/2005/06/08/korean-netizens-attack-
dog-shit-girl (June 29, 2005, 13:24 EST) (exemplifying the sentiment that dog-shit-girl
could not expect privacy because she was in public: "The initial blogger. Do I think he had
every right to post her? Yep. She was in public, and it really doesn't matter if she was in
front of 100 or 1,000,000 people, she was willing to act that way in the public sphere.").
89 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119, 144-45
(2004) (discussing "contextual integrity" as a construct to view privacy violations in relation
to the technology used to commit the violation-if the technology is common, the violation
is less intrusive).
90 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 8.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 7-9, 166.
93 Id. at 166.
94 See id. (asserting that if an individual has a cell phone conversation on a train, despite
the fact that other passengers might overhear the conversation, the individual expects a cer-
tain level of privacy-that the conversation not be recorded and rebroadcast).
95 See id.
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act.96 New technologies increasingly impede upon the privacy and relative
safety that many people enjoy in a public setting. The traditional test to deter-
mine whether or not something is private can no longer depend on the basis of
whether information is publicly exposed.97
III. INCIDENTS OF CYBERHARASSMENT: INTENTIONAL AND
UNINTENTIONAL
As the Internet continues to assert its presence in the lives of Americans, the
exposure of personal information on the Internet increases while online safe
harbors decrease. Exposure can be either intentional or unintentional. In either
case, actions that victimize a person or expose her personal information can
qualify as cyberharassment. The following examples demonstrate intentional
and unintentional cyberharassment.
A. Intentional Cyberharassment: Ryan Halligan
Three years before the suicide of Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old boy
named Ryan Halligan committed suicide following months of online harass-
ment by his peers.98 After suffering from harassment in school during the day,
Ryan returned home to a barrage of instant messages from classmates insinuat-
ing he was gay.9 Both in school and at home, he was the victim of intense har-
assment; the only difference was the mode of the harassment.0 ° Consequently,
Ryan had no offline or online safe harbor.
A few days after Ryan's funeral, his father logged onto his AOL IM account
to investigate Ryan's suicide.' Ryan's father stated, "It was in that safe world
of being somewhat anonymous that several of his classmates told me of the
bullying and cyberbullying that took place during the months that led up to
[Ryan's] suicide."'0 2 His father:
[D]iscovered a folder filled with IM exchanges ... and further interviewed his class-
mates, [and] realized that technology was being utilized as [a weapon] far more effec-
tive and reaching than the simple ones [he] had as [a kid]. Passing handwritten notes
96 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 7-9.
97 Id. at 166.
98 RyanPatrickHalligan.org, In Memory of Ryan Patrick Halligan, http://www.
ryanpatrickhalligan.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
99 See id. ("Thus merely assessing whether information is exposed in public or to others
can no longer be adequate to determining whether we should protect it as private.").
100 See id.; see also Associated Press, States Pushing for Laws to Curb Cyberbullying
FOXNEws.coM, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,253259,00.html
[hereinafter Laws to Curb Cyberbullying].
101 See In Memory of Ryan Patrick Halligan, supra note 98.
102 Id.
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or a "slam" book has since been replaced with on-line tools such as IM, Web sites,
Blogs, cell phones, etc. The list keeps growing with the invention of every new hi-
tech communication gadget.
10 3
Mr. Halligan concluded that harassment through technology magnifies and
amplifies a person's hurt feelings," which, as illustrated by the cases of his
son Ryan and Megan Meier, can encourage teen suicide.05 Mr. Halligan de-
termined that his son suffered from depression amplified by a steady onslaught
of electronic harassment."° The Internet did not cause Ryan's death, but it
served as an accelerator of his pain.' 7
Ryan's case illustrates the intentional form of cyberharassment. Over five
years following Ryan's death, legislatures continue to disagree on how to
properly police cyberharassment.' 0 The increase in cyberharassment may force
many legislatures to take action."° However, even if states enact laws address-
ing cyberharassment, the laws may be ineffective, because harassment involves
a societal norm that cannot be legislated; rather, effective deterrence of har-
assment requires education."' Furthermore, the lack of cyberharassment legis-
lation most likely is due to challenges in drafting the legislation without in-
fringing on free speech rights."' Specifically, legislatures have yet to agree
upon the proper balance between an individual's right to express himself and
simultaneously keep his safety and privacy intact." 2
103 Id.
104 Felicia R. Lee, The Rough-and-Tumble Online Universe Traversed by Young Cyber-
nauts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at El. See also Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note
100 ("The Internet allows students to insult others in relative anonymity, and experts who
study cyberbullying say it can be more damaging to victims than traditional bullying like fist
fights and classroom taunts.").
105 See, e.g., Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 100 (noting that 13-year-old Ryan
Halligan's suicide was caused by continuous Internet harassment); Blank, supra note 27
(explaining 13-year-old Megan Meier committed suicide after receiving continuous insults
via the computer).
106 Abbott Koloff, States Push for Cyberbully Controls, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2008, at
3A.
107 Id.
108 See infra Part V; Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 100 ("States from Oregon
to Rhode Island are considering crackdowns to curb or outlaw the behavior .... ).
109 In response to Ryan's suicide, the Vermont legislature passed an anti-cyberbullying
law. It required schools to regulate bullying both on and off of school grounds and included
bullying over the Internet. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a(a)(6) (2007). Rhode Island State
Senator John Tassoni, who introduced a bill to study cyberbullying, stated, "The kids are
forcing our hands to do something legislatively." Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note
100.
110 Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 100. George McDonough, an education
coordinator with Rhode Island's Department of Education, stated, "You can't legislate
norms, you can only teach norms. Just because it's a law they don't necessarily follow it. I
mean, look at the speed limit." Id.
"I See Koloff, supra note 106; Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 100.
112 See Koloff, supra note 106.
20081
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
B. Unintentional Cyberharassment: Star Wars Kid
In April 2003, Quebec teenager Ghyslian Raza became the target of
"worldwide mockery" when his classmates posted a self-made video of him
practicing his light saber moves on an Internet file-sharing network." 3 The
fourteen-year-old filmed himself for two minutes fighting a mock battle with a
golf ball retriever, even generating his own sound effects while pretending to
be a character from the movie Star Wars: Episode I, The Phantom Menace."4
Apparently, he did not intend the video for public consumption."5 However,
approximately six months later, his classmates discovered it on a shelf of his
school's TV studio" 6 and posted it online where it became an instant phe-
nomenon." 7 Internet users from around the world downloaded the video more
than a million times and nicknamed Ghyslian "Star Wars Kid.""' Bloggers
created remix versions of the video, adding sound and lighting effects." 9 The
mainstream media discovered the story, and soon enough, published
Ghyslian's story in newspapers such as the New York Times.'2
As a result of his newfound popularity, Ghyslian became the victim of se-
vere harassment by people who posted defamatory comments about him on the
Web. 2 ' Ghyslian transferred to another high school to avoid severe tormenting
by his classmates, but dropped out of his new school when the harassment did
not cease.'22 Ghyslian's parents sued his classmates who posted the video
online, claiming that "Ghyslain had to endure, and still endures today, harass-
113 Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, WIRED.COM, June 24, 2003, http://www.wired.com/
culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
114 Id.; Tu Thanh Ha, "Star Wars Kid" Cuts a Deal with His Tormentors, GLOBE &
MAIL, Apr. 7, 2006, at A8, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/
RTGAM.20060407.gtstarwars07/BNStory/Nationa/; Amy Harmon, Fame Is No Laughing
Matter for the "Star Wars Kid, " N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003 at C3.
115 Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, supra note 113.
116 Tu Thanh Ha, supra note 114. The fact that Ghyslian left the video on a shelf at his
school where anyone could access it raises questions about whether he assumed the risk that
someone might discover the tape and post it on the Internet. However, an incident like
Ghyslian's does not give another person the right to invade one's expectation of privacy. If
an assumption of the risk defense were to survive, it would result in paranoia of people like
Ghyslian to enter the public sphere.
117 See Harmon, supra note 114.
118 See Tu Thanh Ha, supra note 114.
119 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 45-46; see also, Harmon, supra note 114.
120 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 114. ("Short videos of embarrassing, funny or illicit
moments are common Internet fare. But this one, known as the Star Wars Kid, has traveled
farther, faster and commanded more attention than any in recent memory. It seems to be
serving as a Rorschach test for geek self-perception.").
121 See, e.g., WAXY.ORG, Star Wars Kid, Apr. 29, 2003, http://www.waxy.org/archive/
2003/04/29/starwar.shtml; see also Harmon, supra note 114.
122 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 114.
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ment and derision from his high-school mates and the public at large."'23 The
case eventually settled; however, the psychiatric damage and emotional dis-
tress had already affected Ghyslain.'
24
The aftermath of Ghyslain's unintended event will forever dub him as "Star
Wars Kid."125 Years later, the video remains viewable and the subject of com-
ment by journalists and bloggers.'26 Nothing prohibited Ghyslain's classmates
from obtaining the video and posting it on the Web site of their choosing. Al-
though most likely unintentional, their actions caused a severe invasion of
Ghyslain's privacy. '
One could argue that by posting the video, Ghyslain's classmates had the in-
tention to harass him via the Web. One could also argue that the millions of
viewers and those who parodied the video had the same intentions. However,
more likely, the viewers saw the video as purely a form of entertainment; they
likely thought only that the video made them laugh and that it would make
others laugh as well. His classmates likely failed to consider the risk to Ghys-
lain's reputation and privacy or the possibility of worldwide harassment of
Ghyslain. Also, his classmates likely were unaware of the possible illegality of
such a prank. The Star Wars Kid incident illustrates the challenging implica-
tions for harassment, which increase as our privacy continues to be compro-
mised through the Web.'28
IV. FEDERAL LAW AND COMMENTARY RELATED TO
CYBERHARASSMENT
Traditional, federal harassment statutes focus on physical contact between
the harasser and the victim and therefore inappropriately address the virtual
nature of cyberharassment' 29 Although Congress has enacted legislation to
123 Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, supra note 113.
124 See id. ("Ghyslain's parents claim their son was so humiliated, he is undergoing psy-
chiatric care and may be marked for life by the experience."); SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 47
(noting that Ghyslain was "deeply scarred by the incident"). Suing a known cyberharasser
can qualify as a potential remedy for victims. However, where there is intentional infliction
of emotional distress so extreme that a person must seek psychiatric help, medication, etc.,
greater punishment is necessary.
125 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 47 ("Forever, Ghyslain will be known as the Star Wars
Kid.").
126 See id. (noting that the video is estimated as the most watched video on the Internet).
127 See id at 45-47 (explaining the video was an unintentional Internet sensation and
ultimately had a significant negative impact on Ghyslain's life).
128 See id. at 47-48.
129 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000) (prohibiting use of a telephone or telecommunications
device to annoy, abuse, harass, or threaten any person at the number called); 18 U.S.C. §
875 (2006) (covering threats and harassment).
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protect children on the Internet, mainly from harmful content,13° enacting legis-
lation to protect victims from harassers on the Internet has not been a congres-
sional priority. 3 ' Victims of cyberharassment are limited to civil litigation as a
remedy: victims can sue for defamation, invasion of privacy, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.' Victims might also find recourse by reporting
a cyberharasser to an ISP and then attempting to sue the ISP itself under sec-
tion 509 of the CDA.'33 However, when utilized in suits for unlawful conduct
over the Internet, these options are increasingly restricted and leave victims of
cyberharassment ineffectively protected.'34 Fortunately, Congress has started to
recognize the increasing problems caused by cyberharassment."'
A. Traditional Defamation Law
Victims of cyberharassment may pursue civil action against cyberharassers
for circulation of information or misinformation under the tort of defamation. 36
The effectiveness of a defamation suit, however, is questionable. Defamation
law attempts to protect against various types of reputation libel and slander, 137
130 See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-544, tit. XVII, 114 Stat.
2763A-335 (2000); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, 120 Stat. 587.
131 But see ADAM THIERER, CONGRESS CONTENT REGULATION, AND CHILD PROTECTION:
THE EXPANDING LEGISLATIVE AGENDA, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., PROGRESS
SNAPSHOT 4.4 at 1, (2008), available at http://pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.
4childprotection.html (illustrating the "explosion of legislative proposals dealing with online
child safety" in the 110"' session of Congress).
132 See infra Part IV.A (explaining the applicability of traditional defamation law to cy-
berharassment); Aftab, supra note 41 ("Often the victims of cyberstalking and cyberharass-
ment are limited to civil litigation .... ").
133 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 223, 110
Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)).
134 See Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419-22 (1st Cir.
2007) (finding very narrow liability for ISPs under the Communications Decency Act). See
generally Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding America
Online to be a publisher under the Communication Decency Act and therefore, immune
from a defamation suit).
135 See infra Part IV.C (explaining recent governmental recognition of the cyberharass-
ment problem). See generally 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26 (regarding the challenge of
cyberstalking to government and industry).
136 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 113.
137 Slander consists of "ephemeral communications such as the speech, gestures, and
sign language"; while libel refers to "defamatory communications of a more or less perma-
nent sort such as printed matter, films, and art work." William J. Andrle, Jr., Extension of
Absolute Privilege to Defamation in Arbitration Proceedings: Sturdivant v. Seaboard Ser-
vice System, Ltd., CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 1073, 1073 n.1 (1984); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 568, 559 (1977); Russ VerSteeg, Slander & Slander Damages after Gertz and
Dun & Bradstreet, 38 VILL. L. REV. 655,659-660 (1993).
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including "reputation as property, as honor, and as dignity."'' Most harassing
communication over the Internet qualifies as libel since it is in print form.'39 In
order to succeed in a defamation lawsuit, a plaintiff must meet six elements
that comprise a libel claim.'40 As defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a
plaintiff must exhibit: (1) a defamatory communication; (2) a false statement of
fact; (3) publication of the false message to a third person; (4) identification of
the plaintiff; (5) depending on the private or public nature of the plaintiff, fault
on the part of the libeler through either negligence or actual malice; and (6)
that the defamation caused injury or harm to the plaintiff.4' A successful plain-
tiff in a defamation suit necessarily trumps any First Amendment rights as-
serted by a defendant.' 42 However, free speech protection occasionally out-
weighs an individual's right to protection from harassment.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue and considered the balance between
protecting free speech and allowing redress for defamatory statements in New
York Times. 43 The law only protects a person from the dissemination of false
and reputation damaging information.'" Defamation law does not protect indi-
viduals from being the target of harassment, which can include negative opin-
ions, criticism, and insults.'45 The power of the Internet increases the opportu-
nity for free speech, but with this opportunity comes the potential for increased
abuse: "In cyberspace, the power to defame is unprecedented."'" Furthermore,
Congress intended to encourage self-policing by Internet users and Web site
operators in order to further expand free speech and the marketplace of ideas in
enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996.' Essentially, the privacy of an
individual on the Internet is valued less than her ability to speak freely.
138 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Con-
stitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 693 (1986).
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (defining defamatory communication). With
respect to defamation, the Restatement defines "communication" broadly as "the fact that
one person has brought an idea to the perception of another." Id. cmt. A.
140 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (enunciating the ele-
ments of a libel claim).
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558; N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280-81.
142 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-83 (finding that in some instances, the benefits
of a citizen's ability to criticize public officials without recourse outweigh the official's
right to be free from defamation.).
143 See id.; SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 118, 126.
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 559, 568. Under the Restatement, a defamatory
statement does not have to cause actual harm to an individual's reputation, rather liability
depends on the tendency of the communication to have such an effect. § 559 cmt. d.
145 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 120.
146 Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Loenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1154 (1996).
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2000) (explaining that the Internet "offer[s] a forum for true
diversity of political discourse" and that the services on the Internet allow "users a great
degree of control over the information they receive").
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Although traditional defamation law may be applied to the Internet and cy-
berharassment, the current law is inadequate for numerous reasons. First, the
likelihood of a plaintiff succeeding in meeting each prong of a libel claim is
slim. The voluntary nature of the Internet makes it difficult for a plaintiff to
rebut a defendant's standard defense-that a victim assumes the risk of har-
assment when she subjects herself to defamation on the Internet.'48 If a victim
of cyberharassment claims that her harasser intentionally or recklessly caused
severe emotional distress, the claim would likely fail due to the heavy burden a
plaintiff carries to show clear-cut proof of the defendant's state of mind.49
Moreover, application of traditional defamation law to the Internet is difficult
because more often than not, plaintiffs do not know the identity of their defam-
ers or harassers. Additionally, because of the Internet's anonymous nature,
plaintiffs who think they know the identity of their harasser could be wrong.
The Megan Meier story exemplifies such a case, and a similar situation could
result in a suit against the wrong person. John Doe lawsuits, which do not ini-
tially identify the cyberharasser by name, are "one of [the] few weapons
against what [persons and corporations] consider digital defamation."'5 ° As
new technologies expand the range of the means of defamation, the targets of
Internet harassment will find it increasingly difficult to prove defamation using
the traditional test.
B. Communications Decency Act
In an effort to stimulate competition in the telecommunications field and
outlaw use of computers and phone lines to transmit indecent material, Con-
gress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act"). 5 ' Title V
148 Sanford & Loenger, supra note 146, at 1158.
149 To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
show: 1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; 2) the defendant's conduct was
extreme and outrageous; and 3) the conduct was the cause 4) of severe emotional distress.
Allen v. Allison, 155 S.W.3d 682, 691 (Ark. 2004); see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 70 (2000)
("One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily
harm resulting from the distress.").
150 Greg Miller, "John Doe'" Suits Threaten Internet Users'Anonymity, L.A. TIMES, June
14, 1999, at Al. John Doe lawsuits are used by plaintiffs in defamation suits when they do
not know who their defamers are, usually in cases involving defamation over the Internet.
See id.
'51 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 ("To promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality service
for American telecommunications .... ); id. sec. 502, § 223 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223)
(making transmission of obscene material via telephone or computer punishable by fine or
imprisonment); see also Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet?
Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
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of the Act was codified as the Communications Decency Act.5 2 Congress en-
acted the CDA to support and promote the dissemination of information on the
Internet, while protecting minors from indecent content on the Internet. 5 3 Sec-
tion 230 of the 1996 Act explains that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider."'54 Section 230 protects
any provider or user of an interactive computer service that restricts access to,
or availability of, material the provider or user believes to be indecent from
liability for defamatory content.'55 By classifying ISPs'56 and hosts of online
forums as publishers or distributors of content, the CDA immunized them from
liability for defamatory content submitted by their users.' Congress reasoned
that holding ISPs liable for the actions of its subscribers was too great a threat
35 (1998) (noting that the CDA was signed into law as part of the 1996 Act).
152 Telecommunications Act of 1996, tit. V.
153 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2000). The Communications Decency Act was enacted, in part,
"to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services," and to promote the free market concept best achieved
with minimal government regulation. Id
154 Telecommunication Act of 1996 § 509(c)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). Section
230 was enacted specifically
[T]o overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees be-
lieve that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of em-
powering parents to determine the content of communications their children receive
through interactive computer services.
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208.
1 § 230(c). The relevant portion of the statute provides
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such mate-
rial is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
Id.
156 The statute defines an ISP as an "interactive computer service," i.e., "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educa-
tional institutions." § 230(f(2). Furthermore, the statute defines an "information content
provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." § 230(f)(3).
157 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 152.
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to free speech. "8 The blanket immunity provided by section 230 was intended
to serve various public interests.'59 For example, Congress wanted ISPs to be
able to self-regulate, promote the free exchange of information, and further
advance growth of the Internet. 6
However, in retrospect, the law may not be serving the public interest as
Congress intended. Numerous court decisions upholding ISP immunity under
section 230 demonstrate that the statute is overly broad, or at a minimum, the
statute has been interpreted unnecessarily broadly by the courts.'6 ' Individuals
subjected to extreme online harassment appear to have no claim under section
230 because the medium of their harassment is immune from liability. 62 Yet
clause (b) of section 230 explicitly states that "[i]t is the policy of the United
States... to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of com-
puter. '' 63 Nonetheless, this policy has not been enforced or has been over-
looked. Courts have found ISPs immune from liability for any kind of defama-
tory comments posted by their users, including those of a stalking or harassing
nature. Part of Congress's reasoning for enacting section 230 was to protect
minors from offensive content.'"
A summary of relevant case law illustrates this point. In the first post-CDA
decision in 1997, Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") interpreted section 230 as
removing publisher and distributor liability for Internet communication forums
despite the extreme online harassment suffered by the petitioner, Kenneth Ze-
ran.'
65
About a week after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Zeran had his phone
number anonymously posted in an advertisement on an AOL bulletin board."6
The advertisement offered T-shirts for purchase with distasteful slogans about
the Oklahoma City bombing. 67 The message stated that interested people
158 Id.
159 § 230(b) (listing five policies supported by the immunity provided to ISPs).
160 § 230(b)(1)-(4).
161 See Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that "under Communications Decency Act[,] Internet message board operator was im-
mune from liability for allegedly false and defamatory postings made by third party sub-
scribers."); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Section
230... plainly immunizes computer service providers... from liability for information that
originates with third parties.").
162 § 230(c). See Lycos, 478 F.3d at 413; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
163 § 230(b)(5).
164 § 230(b).
165 See generally Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
166 Id. at 329 (explaining that the posting was entitled "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts").
167 Id.
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should call "Ken" and listed Zeran's phone number as the contact.168 However,
Zeran had not posted the advertisement.'69 He learned about the posting when
he began receiving harassing phone calls from angered Oklahomans threaten-
ing violence or death. 7 ' The phone calls became constant, with Zeran receiving
threats approximately every two minutes. 7' Zeran called AOL to demand that
the posting be removed and that a retraction be posted.'72 AOL agreed to re-
move the posting but declined to post a retraction.' The calls to Zeran's house
continued, and he discovered that there was a second posting stating new T-
shirts were available with new slogans.'74 Furthermore, the new posting said
that callers should ask for "Ken" and to "please call back if busy."' 75 The calls
continued despite Zeran's additional calls to AOL demanding that the posting
be taken down.'76 Zeran's position worsened when a local radio station discov-
ered the posting and the broadcaster encouraged listeners to call Zeran and ex-
press their outrage.'77 The situation escalated to the point that Zeran needed
police to monitor his house.'78 Once the mainstream media reported the inaccu-
racy of the advertisement, the calls subsided. However, Zeran was so disturbed
by the ordeal that he had started taking anti-anxiety medication.'79
Zeran sued AOL, claiming that the service provider unreasonably delayed
its removal of the defamatory postings. 80 The Fourth Circuit cited section 230
and explained that the statute created immunity against any action which seeks
to impose ISP liability for a third party posting. 8 ' The Court went on to explain
the congressional intent behind enactment of section 230:
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized
168 See id.
169 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (explaining that an "unidentified person" posted the ad-
vertisement and describing it as an "anonymously perpetrated prank").
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. Zeran ran a business out of his home, for which he gave out his phone number.
Because he did not want to hurt his business, he did not change his phone number. Id.
176 Id. Zeran was told that "the individual account from which the messages were posted
would soon be closed." Id. Zeran also reported the cases to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion office in Seattle, Washington. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
'80 Id. He did not bring any action against the party who posted the messages, claiming
that AOL made it impossible to identify the original defamer because it neglected to keep
adequate records of its users. Id. at 329 n.1.
181 Id. at 330. The court explained that the operation of section 230 "precludes courts
from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role."
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the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeon-
ing Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers or the com-
munications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive
government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the ro-
bust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interfer-
ence in the medium to a minimum .... Congress further stated that it is the policy of
the United States ... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that pres-
ently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.'
82
Opponents of Internet regulation argue that creating immunity for service
providers is important because it prevents the chilling of speech that might re-
sult otherwise. They argue that expecting a service provider to monitor and
filter out each defamatory comment or complaint is unrealistic.
As a result of section 230's broad immunity, however, a victim of harass-
ment like Zeran is left with limited legal options. Zeran's case exemplifies an
overly broad interpretation of section 230 and provides too much immunity for
service providers, thereby failing to balance properly speech and privacy.'83
Zeran's right to privacy was violated in order to promote the right of free
speech. The problem has only worsened over the years, as Web sites created
purely for the purpose of spreading gossip and rumors have proliferated.'84 De-
spite the fact that these sites result in an extreme violation of a person's pri-
vacy, section 230's immunity clause protects these sites.
85
Recently, however, courts have made an effort to narrow the statutory inter-
pretation of section 230186 and are questioning whether a full liability shield is
necessary." 7 In cases where an ISP solicits or edits information, courts are
looking to whether ISPs can be held liable for collecting particular types of
information. 8 8 For example, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley
182 Id. (citations omitted). See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that an online computer service
could be treated as a "publisher" and therefore be responsible for allegedly libelous state-
ments made by an anonymous poster, even if the server was not aware of the statements).
183 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 159.
184 Id. See, e.g., Juicy Campus, http://www.juicycampus.com (Last visited Sept. 8, 2008)
("C'mon. Give us the juice. Posts are totally, 100% anonymous.").
185 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 159 ("These websites thrive under Section 230's broad
immunity.").
186 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 (N.D. I11. 2006) (questioning in dicta the scope of Zeran and
whether the Craigslist website is a publisher), afFd, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 926
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that creation and development of a discriminatory online question-
naire by the website Roommates.com made it an information content provider with no im-
munity under section 230).
187 See Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 927.
188 See id. ("We now turn to the more difficult question of whether the CDA exempts
Roommate from liability for publishing and distributing its members' profiles, which it
generates from their answers to the form questionnaires.").
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v. Roommates.com, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found Roomates.com liable with no immunity under section 230 because it
created and developed a questionnaire that was discriminatory in nature.'89 The
court distinguished its holding from another case, Carafano v. Metros-
plash.com, Inc.,"9' stating
Carafano provided CDA immunity for information posted by a third party that was
not, in any sense, created or developed by the website operator-indeed, that was pro-
vided despite the website's rules and policies. We are not convinced that Carafano
would control in a situation where defamatory, private or otherwise tortuous or unlaw-
ful information was provided by users in direct response to questions and prompts
from the operator of the website.' 9'
Another court chose not to follow the standard set by Zeran and stated that it
was overbroad and inconsistent.'92 In the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois decision Chicago Lawyers' Commission For Civil
Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., the court chose instead to look to
the plain meaning of section 230. The court found that although the language
of the statute does not grant ISP immunity per se, the statute does "prohibit
treatment as a publisher, which, quite plainly, would bar any cause of action
that requires, to establish liability, a finding that an [ISP] published third-party
content."'93 Essentially, the court strived for a more narrow reading of section
230 and observed that it seemed unlikely that Congress had intended to grant
broad immunity to ISPs under the CDA that do not screen any third-party con-
tent. 94 At a minimum, the court found that section 230(c)(1) bars claims that
189 Id. at 926-27.
190 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007). Metrosplash.com
owned a dating Web site that used a questionnaire that a user could fill out to create an
online profile. Id. at 1120. One of its users created a fake profile using the real information
of an actress, Christianne Carafano. Id. The information included her home address, phone
number, and made lewd remarks about what she liked to do sexually. Id. at 1121. The pro-
file attracted attention and the actress received threats and was defamed online. Id. at 112 1-
22. The court did not find Metrosplash.com liable for the actions of the third party, despite
the fact that it created the questionnaire used. Id. at 1125. The court reasoned that Metros-
plash.com did not play an important role in creating, developing, or transforming the infor-
mation. Id.
191 Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 928 (citation omitted).
192 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm., 461 F. Supp. 2d at 695. The court found Zeran to be
unpersuasive because it "overstate[d] the plain language of Section 230(c)(1)." Id. at 693.
The court stated that because section 230(c)(1) does not mention the term "immunity" or
any similar phrase therein, the interpretation of the law is too broad. Id. at 693-94. The court
also found Zeran inconsistent in its application of immunity to ISPs. It stated that Zeran
distinguished between ISPs that act like professional publishers versus ISPs that act like a
"publisher" by "making information generally known or by disseminating information to the
public." Id at 694. In other words, Zeran failed to include ISPs that do not edit or choose
what information to post, but nevertheless serve as a board for third party postings. Id.
193 Id. at 696.
194 Id. at 697.
20081
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
require publishing as a critical element with which to find an ISP liable for
defamatory comments posted by third parties.'95 The court stated that under
their narrow interpretation of section 230, states may enact rules that "induce
or require online service providers to protect the interests of third
parties ... .'"96
The Roommates.com and Craigslist decisions provide little help to a victim
of cyberharassment. Harassment is an act performed by a third party, and un-
der these decisions, ISPs maintain immunity from liability for the unfavorable
actions of third parties using their services. The Seventh Circuit decision pro-
vided some hope for the cyberharassment victim by reading section 230 in a
strict and narrow manner. However, limited legal options exist for cyberhar-
assment victims under section 230, unless a victim can show that a third
party's defamatory comments directly responded to the publications by an ISP,
or that the ISP participated in or facilitated the defamation.'97
C. 2001 Report to Congress on Stalking and Domestic Violence
As the new millennium approached, the Federal Government recognized
that despite the tremendous benefits the Internet provides,'98 many of its
traits-like low cost, ease of use, and anonymous nature-made it an attractive
platform for cyberharassers.' 9 In 1999, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") re-
leased a report, the 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law
Enforcement and Industry ("1999 DOJ Report").°" The DOJ expanded its find-
ings in 2001 and submitted an additional report to Congress, the Stalking and
Domestic Violence Report to Congress ("2001 DOJ Report"). '
195 Id.
196 Id. Under Zeran, states would not be able to enact such laws because they would be
inconsistent with section 230. Id. The holding was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in March 2008. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. For Civil Rights Under
the Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
197 For example, an ISP may solicit defamatory information about individuals as the
discriminatory questionnaire at issue in the Roomates.com case did. See Fair Hous. Council
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2007).
198 See 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26. ("The Internet and other telecommunications
technologies are promoting advances in virtually every aspect of society and every corner of
the globe: fostering commerce, improving education and health care, promoting participa-
tory democracy in the United States and abroad, and facilitating communications among
family and friends .....
199 Id.
200 See id.
201 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STALKING AND DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE REPORT TO CONGRESS
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 DOJ REPORT], available at http:www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/OJP/
186157.pdf. The government's use of the term cyberstalking in the 2001 Report is synony-
mous with the term cyberharassment; thus, what is described as cyberstalking in the report
will be referred to as cyberharassment. See id. at 1; discussion supra Part 1I.
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In the 2001 DOJ Report, the U.S. Attorney General recommended ways to
protect people from cyberharassment, including self-help by potential victims,
training law enforcement and the Internet industry on the dangers of cyberhar-
assment, and explaining the legal tools available to address the problem.2" The
report highlighted a number of differences between offline and online harass-
ment including differences in proximity between the harasser and the victim." 3
It emphasized that while there are similarities between online and offline har-
assment, the Internet and other communications mediums such as wireless
handheld devices and fax machines provide new methods for harassers to pur-
sue their victims:
A cyber[harasser] may send repeated, threatening, or harassing messages by the sim-
ple push of a button; more sophisticated cyber[harassers] use programs to send mes-
sages at regular or random intervals without being physically present at the computer
terminal .... In addition, a cyber[harasser] can dupe other Internet users into harass-
ing or threatening a victim by . . . [utilizing Internet] bulletin boards or chat
room[s] .... 204
The DOJ recommended that states review their existing statutes to determine
if they address cyberharassment; if they do not, states should expand their stat-
utes.20 ' The report also recommended amending federal law to make it easier to
track down cyberharassers while preserving privacy safeguards. °"
1. Law Enforcement Efforts
The 2001 DOJ Report recognized that for a number of reasons law enforce-
ment has insufficiently responded to cyberharassment, despite the fact that
many agencies have large cyberharassment caseloads.2 7 Lack of training and
expertise of law enforcement officials can frustrate victims and limit law en-
forcement response."8 Many cyberharassment crimes go unreported because
victims believe the conduct is not grave enough to report or that authorities
will not take them seriously.29 Additionally, law enforcement agencies rarely
202 See 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 12, 14.
203 Id. at 3. ("Offline stalking generally requires the perpetrator and the victim to be lo-
cated in the same geographic area; cyberstalkers may be located across the street or across
the country.").
204 Id. at 2.
205 Id. at 12.
206 See id Specifically, the report stated that amending the CCPA to provide access to
subscriber records under the same standards as for e-mail subscribers would make it more
feasible to track down cyberharassers and keep privacy safeguards intact. Id.
207 See id. at 5 ("Based on recent informal surveys of law enforcement agencies, it ap-
pears that the majority of law enforcement agencies have not investigated or prosecuted
cyberstalking cases.").
208 See id.
209 Id.
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have the appropriate training to recognize a cyberharassment crime and inves-
tigate the offense." ' Such inadequacies result in cyberharassment victims being
told by police and law enforcement to either turn off their computers or come
back online when a cyberharasser goes offline.2'
The 2001 DOJ Report also recognized the jurisdictional limitations involved
and the frustrations that arise when agencies attempt to investigate a cyberhar-
assment crime across state lines.2 2 It acknowledged that there is a lack of con-
sistent statutory authority-some state laws explicitly punish violators for har-
assment over electronic mediums, while others punish online harassment by
amending existing, traditional anti-harassment statutes." Furthermore, in
states that do not specify cyberharassment in any statutory form, cyberharass-
ment may not be considered a crime. 4
In addition, the 2001 DOJ Report recognized that federal law can limit an
agency from investigating a harasser in cyberspace. 15 Specifically, the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("CCPA") bans "disclosure of cable sub-
scriber records without a court order and advance notice to the subscriber. 216
This is significant because a large percentage of Americans subscribe to broad-
band Internet access through their cable providers.217 Therefore, the CCPA im-
poses a considerable hurdle that law enforcement agencies must overcome to
investigate cybercrimes like cyberharassment.218 To alleviate the problem, the
2001 DOJ Report suggested harmonizing federal law by providing agencies
access to cable subscriber records under the same privacy protections that gov-
ern law enforcement access to e-mail subscribers.219
210 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 5.
211 See id. at 5, 8 ("Responding to a victim's complaint by saying 'turn off your com-
puter' or 'change your telephone number' is not acceptable.").
212 See id. at 12. For further discussion on jurisdictional limitations, see infra Part V.A.
213 2001 DOJ REPORT,supra note 201, at 6; see infra Part V.A.
214 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 6.
215 Id.
216 Id. See 47 U.S.C. § 55 1(c), (h) (2000).
217 See FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 2-3 tbl.2.1 (2008), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-284932A1.pdf (based on the number of
lines, not necessarily the number of subscribers). In June 2007, there were approximately
34.4 million cable modem lines and approximately 29 million ADSL and fiber lines. Id.
218 See 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 6.
219 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). The relevant portion of the statute states
(2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall
disclose to a governmental entity the-
(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or
records of session times and durations; (D) length of service (including start date)
and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and (F)
means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank ac-
count number), of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmen-
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The 2001 DOJ Report further recognized that anonymity is a very serious
complication in investigating and prosecuting cyberharassment crimes. 2' As
evidenced by cases like Zeran, the Internet makes sending anonymous com-
munications relatively simple. 2 ' This makes it difficult for victims, ISPs, and
law enforcement to find and identify the individual or group responsible for
defamatory or harassing communications.22 A possible solution to this prob-
lem is tracing electronic communications, but it would require a significant
modification of law enforcement methods for surveillance and investigation. 23
In addition, proper training for law enforcement officials that would make
them technologically proficient would allow for the efficient enforcement of
cybercrimes.224
2. Industry Efforts
The 2001 DOJ Report also established that despite an attempt by the Internet
industry to inhibit abusive electronic communications, it has not addressed
cyberharassment in particular.225 Instead, ISPs focused on providing consumers
with techniques to avoid online harassment rather than establishing anti-
harassment programs. 226 The 2001 DOJ Report listed a number of obstacles
that cyberharassment victims must overcome to receive help from their ISPs,
such as hard-to-find complaint procedures, vague policies on what constitutes
harassment, and lack of follow-up on complaints.227 ISPs responded that al-
though providing such protection is in the best interest of their customers, im-
posing additional reporting and response requirements on ISPs is very costly
tal entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or
a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under para-
graph (1).
220 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 6 (noting also that anonymity provide the ha-
rasser with an advantage over the victim and law enforcement).
221 See 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26; 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 6-7.
Anonymous e-mail communications include two forms:
The first [form] allows individuals to create a free electronic mailbox through a web
site .... [S]uch services almost never authenticate or otherwise confirm this informa-
tion .... The second form comprises mail servers that purposefully strip identifying in-
formation and transport headers from electronic mail. By forwarding [e-mail] through
several of these services serially, a stalker can nearly perfectly anonymize the message.
1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26.
222 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 7.
223 See id. ("Traditional law enforcement techniques for surveillance, investigation, and
evidence gathering require modification for use on computer networks and often require the
use of unfamiliar legal processes.").
224 Id. at 8.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
20081
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
and could result in smaller ISPs losing capital, thereby placing them at a com-
petitive disadvantage.228
The 2001 DOJ Report stated that the Internet industry, however, made a
considerable effort to inform consumers on methods to protect themselves
online.229 Various programs have been implemented, such as the Cybercitizen
Partnership of 1999 ("Partnership"). The Partnership is an agreement between
the Internet industry and the Federal Government, focusing on raising public
awareness of computer crime issues, specifically those that target children and
adolescents.23 Other initiatives focus on enabling consumers to protect them-
selves from unsolicited communications.' Overall, the Internet industry be-
lieved that the best way to address the cyberharassment problem was by edu-
cating consumers.232 Moreover, the 2001 DOJ Report recognized that closer
cooperation between the Internet industry and law enforcement would better
serve consumers in combating cyberharassment.233
V. EXISTING POLICY ADDRESSING CYBERHARASSMENT AND A
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTORY SCHEME
A. State Legislation
Law enforcement agencies estimate that 20% to 40% of all stalking cases
involve electronic means.234 Currently, forty-five states have enacted laws that
explicitly qualify certain types of electronic forms of communication as cyber-
harassment.3 Some states include cyberharassment as part of their general
harassment statutes. The language of general harassment statutes can, but does
not always, include specific references to electronic communications as a
228 Id. Furthermore, the Internet industry asserted that the decentralized nature of the
Internet makes it difficult for ISPs to collect and submit report on data for undefined issues
like cyberharassment. Id.
229 Id. at 9. Various initiatives have been implemented to assist consumers in protecting
themselves, such as Project OPEN (Online Public Education Network) and GetNetWise.
com. Id.; Get Net Wise, http://www.getnetwise.org.
230 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 9. The DOJ and the Information Technology
Association of America created the Partnership. Id. In addition to boosting public aware-
ness, the Partnership also sought to "provide resources for government to draw on in ad-
dressing computer crime." Id.
231 Id. For example, when consumers are in Internet chat rooms, they have the ability to
block or ignore messages from those who are attempting to harass them. Users also have
devices on their e-mail accounts that block cyberharassers. Id.
232 Id.
233 See id. at 10.
234 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Computer Harassment or "Cyber-
stalking" Laws, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/stalk99.htm.
235 See id.
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source of harassment. 36 Other states have enacted entirely separate laws for
cyberharassment1 37 For example, Florida includes cyberharassment as part of
its general harassment law,238 whereas North Carolina has a separate section for
cyberharassment under its computer crime statutes.239
More often than not, however, the "current patchwork" of active state cy-
berharassment laws limits the protection of victims. Sometimes state harass-
ment laws neglect victims altogether because "conflicting state statutes-
riddled with complex jurisdictional issues--often deter law enforcement from
ever getting involved. '24" For instance, in Missouri, cyberharassment currently
qualifies as a misdemeanor,24" ' whereas in Illinois, it is considered a class 4 fel-
ony.242 Furthermore, the requisite intent to cause emotional distress in a victim
may also differ across states. The penalties for cyberharassment can also
vary. 43 Because no federal law addressing cyberharassment exists, the prob-
236 See Valetk, supra note 18; see also National Conference of State Legislatures, supra
note 234 ("State laws that do not include specific references to electronic communication
may still apply to those who threaten or harass others online, but specific language can make
the laws easier to enforce.").
237 See Valetk, supra note 18.
238 See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 953 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla.
2007) ("To prove the crime of Stalking, the State must prove the following element beyond
a reasonable doubt: (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly tfollowedl e [har-
assed] or [cyberstalkedi (victim)." (alternations and parentheses in original)).
239 SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2005). The relevant portion of the statute states
(b) It is unlawful for a person to:
(1) Use in electronic mail or electronic communication any words or language
threatening to inflict bodily harm to any person or to that person's child, sib-
ling, spouse, or dependent, or physical injury to the property of any person, or
for the purpose of extorting money or other things of value from any person.
(2) Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another repeatedly, whether
or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of abusing, annoying, threatening,
terrifying, harassing, or embarrassing any person.
(3) Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another and to knowingly
make any false statement concerning death, injury, illness, disfigurement, inde-
cent conduct, or criminal conduct of the person electronically mailed or of any
member of the person's family or household with the intent to abuse, annoy,
threaten, terrify, harass, or embarrass.
(4) Knowingly permit an electronic communication device under the person's con-
trol to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section.
Id.
240 Valetk, supra note 18; see 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26 ("Some state and local
law enforcement agencies also have been frustrated by jurisdictional limitations.").
241 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.225(4) (Supp. 2007) ("The crime of stalking [offline or
through electronic communications] shall be a class A misdemeanor for the first offense.).
The statute may soon be amended to implement federal penalties for cyberharassment. See
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008).
242 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5(c) (2006) ("Cyberstalking is a Class 4 felony. A
second or subsequent conviction for cyberstalking is a Class 3 felony.").
243 Compare MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 § 43(a) (West 2008) (making a threat with
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lems of inconsistent statutes persist, and the need for a uniform federal statute
becomes evident.
B. Video Voyeurism Statutes
As the need for effective cyberharassment laws becomes more apparent,
Congress is taking notice and starting to address various types of interactive
harassment. Congress has recognized different degrees of privacy that advance
protection beyond the traditional idea that when in public, people have no le-
gitimate expectations of privacy.2" One illustration of this recognition is legis-
lation against video voyeurism, the video version of "gratification derived from
[secretly] observing the genitals or sexual acts of others." '245 Technological con-
vergence and advances in digital photography have made video voyeurism
relatively easy.246 For instance, cell phones with still photo or video capture
capabilities allow a perpetrator to take nude pictures or "upskirt" photos (those
taken up women's skirts) and quickly post them online.247 Video voyeurism can
rise to the level of stalking when stalkers use new technology to monitor their
victim's movements.248 A stalker could monitor a victim's movements, for ex-
ample, by implanting micro cameras to observe and monitor the victim in her
home.249
Similar to the problems presented by differing state cyberharassment laws,
states address video voyeurism in different and sometimes conflicting ways. 5
Some have separate video voyeurism laws and others have added the proper
language to existing statutes. 5' Accordingly, courts are approaching and inter-
preting the concept of privacy differently in the context of reviewing video
voyeurism laws.
the intent to place a person in imminent fear a crime of stalking), with VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-60(A)(1) (2004) (making any person who knowingly communicates in a writing, which
includes an electronically transmitted writing, threats to harm that person or his family
guilty of a class 6 felony).
244 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 166 (discussing the need to rethink the "binary" notion of
public privacy in public).
245 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1609 (8th ed. 2004).
246 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 166.
247 Id.
248 New Frontiers of Stalking-Video Voyeurism, STALKING REs. CTR. NEWSLETTER
(Stalking Res. Ctr., Wash., D.C.), Winter 2003, at 1-2, available at http://www.ncvc.org/
src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=33502.
249 Id. ("While the activities of stalking and video voyeurism seem related, it is still un-
clear as to what the exact relationship is between them .... What is not clear ... is whether
the use of this technology alone can be considered a form of stalking.").
250 Id.
251 Id. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 2002) (lewd conduct in public), with
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (2001) (harassment and stalking).
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In one case, two men took upskirt photos of unsuspecting women in a
mall. 2 2 Both men were caught and were convicted under a video voyeurism
statute in Washington State.53 The Washington Supreme Court later over-
turned the conviction because the "plain language of the statute" did not cover
an intrusion of privacy in a public place. 5" The court stated that "casual sur-
veillance frequently occurs in public. Therefore, public places could not logi-
cally constitute locations where a person could reasonably expect to be safe
from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance."2 "' However, the Washington
legislature disagreed that taking upskirt photos was a form of casual surveil-
lance and later amended the applicable statute to cover surveillance in both
public and private places. 6
Other states extended protection to different locations where a person can
reasonably expect to have privacy. For example, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey overturned a lower court decision and found a husband's video surveil-
lance of his estranged wife as both harassment and stalking.257 The court rea-
soned that under the totality of the circumstances, the husband's conduct could
constitute harassment and stalking rather than one or the other.258
At the federal level, in an effort to clarify when video voyeurism qualifies as
a crime, Congress enacted the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act in 2004.259 It
criminalized video voyeurism and explicitly stated that the act is unlawful, re-
gardless of whether it is committed in public or private areas 6.2 " The statute,
however, only applies to video voyeurism committed on federal property,
252 State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 149 (Wash. 2002).
253 Id. The relevant portion of the statute states
(2) A person commits the crime of voyeurism if, for the purpose of arousing or gratify-
ing the sexual desire of any person, he or she knowingly views, photographs, or films
another person without that person's knowledge and consent while the person being
viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy
REV. CODE WASH. § 9A.44.115 (West 2003).
254 Glas, 54 P.3d at 151.
255 Id. at 150.
256 H.B. 1001, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (enacted); REV. CODE WASH. §
9A.44.115 (West 2003).
257 H.E.S. v. J.C.S. 815 A.2d 405, 408 (N.J. 2003).
258 Id. at 415 (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 395 (N.J. 1998) ("[C]ourts must
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the harassment statute has
been violated.")).
259 Pub. L. No. 108-495, 118 Stat. 3999 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1801) ("Whoever ... has the intent to capture an image of a private area of an individual
without their consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in which the individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.").
260 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
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which excludes most local shopping centers."' Accordingly, video voyeurism,
when committed in all public and private places is still not a criminal act under
federal law, and thus, states are forced to craft and enforce laws governing
public and private places.262 This further illustrates the need for a uniform fed-
eral statute that provides a person with a reasonable expectation of privacy in
public places and criminalizes video voyeurism and other types of cyberhar-
assment.
C. Interstate Communications
Section 875(c) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code makes it a federal crime to
transmit communication via interstate commerce-including through tele-
phone, e-mail, beepers, and the Internet-that contains a threat to injure an-
other person.263 Violators may spend up to five years in prison and face signifi-
cant fines.2" Although 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is an important anti-harassment stat-
ute, its application to cyberharassment is limited. First, the statute applies to
actual threats and does not reach cases where a violator engages in cyberhar-
assment that is meant to annoy or cause emotional distress.265 Also, the statute
may or may not apply to situations where an initial harasser encourages third
parties to harass a certain person.2"
D. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005
In 2005, the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reau-
thorization Act ("Violence Against Women Act") was enacted as an amend-
ment to 47 U.S.C. § 223.267 The original statute prohibited anyone from using a
261 See SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 167.
262 See id
263 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
264 Id; see United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1501 (6th Cir. 1997) (Krupansky,
J., dissenting)
The words in section 875 are simple, clear, concise, and unambiguous. The plain, ex-
pressed statutory language commands only that the alleged communication must con-
tain any threat to kidnap or physically injure any person, made for any reason or no
reason. Section 875(c) by its terms does not confine the scope of criminalized commu-
nications to those directed to identified individuals ....
Id.
265 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 10 ("[Section 875] applies to communications
of actual threats and cannot be used in a case where a stalker engaged in a pattern of conduct
intended to harass or annoy another.").
266 Id. at 12.
267 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 2987 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
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telephone or electronic device "without disclosing his identity and with intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person . "..."268 Section 113 of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act broadened the statute to apply to "any device or
software that can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of
communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet." '269
The amendment caused great backlash from First Amendment scholars and
those pushing to criminalize cyberharassment.270 Primarily, First Amendment
issues arise because the provision is worded so broadly that it could chill an-
noying Web speech meant to inform.27 ' Unlike the one-to-one communication
of telephone calls, the Internet is a forum for public speech. Because of its pub-
lic nature, speech on the Internet garners more First Amendment protections.272
Section 113 of the Violence Against Women Act therefore is subject to higher
constitutional scrutiny because it applies to the Internet. Furthermore, the
amendment threatens to criminalize the very act of communicating anony-
mously, a right the First Amendment protects.273
Second, a fundamental part of the statute is the mens rea provision: a person
must have the "intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person. '274 The
statute likely will prove successful when applied narrowly to individuals who
intend to harass a person.27' However, as evidenced in cases like that of Megan
Meier, intent to harass a person often cannot be proven. Moreover, if the stat-
ute omits the intent requirement, it becomes far too broad to be effective.
Third, section 223 applies only to direct communications between the ha-
rasser and his victim.276 Therefore, unless the anonymous harasser can be
traced, the Violence Against Women Act would not apply to a cyberharass-
ment situation if the harassment occurs over an ISP bulletin board or chat
room. Finally, violation of section 223 results only in a misdemeanor punish-
able by no more than two years in prison rather than a felony with a harsher
and longer penalty.277
268 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000).
269 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act § 113.
270 See Wendy McElroy, Does New Cyberstalking Law Criminalize Free Expression?,
FOXNEws.coM, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,181958,00.html.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Posting of Kurt Opsahl, Here We Go Again: Law Attempts to Limit Anonymous
Online Speech, to Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org./
deeplinks/2006/01/here-we-go-again-law-attempts-limit-anonymous-online-speech (Jan. 9,
2006). See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960)
("[A]nonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.").
274 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1) (2000).
275 See Opsahl, supra note 273.
276 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 11; 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
277 2001 DOJ REPORT, supra note 201, at 11.
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E. Legal Solutions: Striking a Balance Between Privacy and Free Speech
The right to free speech is fundamental to a person's "moral and intellectual
development," but with it comes the responsibility to ensure that contempora-
neous rights, like the right to privacy, are not invaded.278 The right of individual
expression undoubtedly is important. However, mounting evidence suggests
that assurance of the right to freedom of expression on the Internet is often at
the expense of individual privacy.279 Due to the lack of government regulation
of the Internet and "the historical development of the Internet along laissez-
faire principles," a very broad reading of free speech has resulted.28° In turn, the
lenient interpretation of freedom of expression has caused a threat to public
safety, as illustrated by cyberharassment. Additionally, issues arise with legis-
lation because of freedom of speech and invasion of privacy challenges.28" '
The problem with most legislation regulating the Internet is that it is too
sweeping in nature by proposing to regulate legitimate Web sites and speech in
order to punish a small number of violators.282 For example, the Deleting
Online Predators Act, introduced in 2006 by then Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-
PA), would "require schools and libraries that receive federal universal service
support to block minors' access to social networking sites." '283 Sponsors of the
legislation argue that social networking sites like MySpace attract online
predators and child pornography.284 However, as Adam Thierer of the Progress
& Freedom Foundation notes, "censoring these sites will do little to weed out
these problems and instead merely block access to sites that are socially bene-
ficial. ,285
The solution to combating cyberharassment lies in crafting a narrow federal
278 Julie Dare, Cyberharassment and Online Defamation: A Default Form of Regula-
tions?, II TRANSFORMATIONS (2005), http://www.transformationsjoumal.org/joumal/
issue 1 1/article04.shtml.
279 Id. ("[O]n the Internet, the focus is on the right to freedom of expression, rather than
on the responsibility to ensure that this right is exercised with due care and respect for the
rights of others.").
280 Id. (describing the liberal interpretation of free speech rights on the Internet).
281 Koloff, supra note 106 (describing the efforts of the American Civil Liberties Union
and other in opposition to cyberbullying laws).
282 ADAM THIERER, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., IS MYSPACE THE GOVERNMENT'S
SPACE?, PROGRESS SNAPSHOT 2.16 at 2 (2006), available at http:// www.pff.org/issues-pubs/
ps/2006/ps_2.16_myspace.pdf. Because online harassment can involve a "breadth of con-
duct," anti-cyberharassment statutes usually need to be broad in order to be effective. Simul-
taneously, because cyberharassment deals with "expressive conduct and speech," anti-
cyberharassment statutes have to be formulated and enforced in a way that does not violate
speech protected by the First Amendment. 1999 DOJ REPORT, supra note 26.
283 THIERER, supra note 282, at 1; Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006, H.R. 5319,
109th Cong. § 3 (2006).
284 THIERER, supra note 282, at I.
285 Id.
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law that prohibits cyberharassment. Any such legislation should aim to meet
three criteria. First, cyberharassment should be recognized as harassment to-
wards a person that induces emotional distress or fear of bodily injury over an
electronic medium. Second, privacy safeguards should be maintained, meaning
that information that is considered private by reasonable individuals should
remain private. And third, the right to free speech-the right of a person to
express his ideas, so long as they do not aim to inflict fear in a person-should
be upheld. This comment proposes the following legislation:
Cyberharassment defined
Under Congress's Article I commerce power,286 it shall be unlawful for any person or
group, known or anonymous, to utilize a computer network form of electronic com-
munication to target a specific person for no defined purpose, and through the use of
words or language, aim to harass, annoy, embarrass, abuse, threaten, induce fear of
bodily harm, or a combination thereof, in a victim.
It shall be lawful to trace the Internet Protocol address or equivalent of an anonymous
third party utilizing an Internet Service Provider for means of investigating cyberhar-
assment.
It is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $500,000, when severe emotional
distress inflicted in a victim is a direct result of the above described cyberharassment.
It is a Federal Crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, when death of a victim is
a direct result of the above described cyberharassment.
This proposed statute is not the exclusive means through which the Federal
Government could combat cyberharassment. Rather, it illustrates how cyber-
harassment can be outlawed without violating privacy or free speech laws. Un-
til the Federal Government enacts an anti-cyberharassment law, the best means
with which to combat the issue is to educate consumers.287 Internet users need
to be aware of the consequences of posting personal information online and as
a result, the dangers of cyberharassment by individuals and groups.288 Further-
more, self-help solutions are available. Ignoring communications from those
who a person believes to be a potential cyberharasser is the best first step to
stop cyberharassment 89 Traceable anonymity allows victims of cyberharass-
286 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States .... ").
287 See National Crime Prevention Council, Delete Cyberbullying, http://www.ncpc.org/
newsroorn/current-campaigns/cyberbullying (last visited Sept. 3, 2008); WiredSafety.org,
http://www.wiredsafety.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).
288 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 204. A survey of 267 pairs of teens and parents by a psy-
chology professor at California State University-Dominguez Hills reported that two-thirds
of parents had never talked with their teens about their MySpace use. Michelle Andrews,
Decoding MySpace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 18, 2006, at 50. Additionally, 38%
of them had never seen their child's MySpace profile. Id.
289 See Aftab, supra note 41.
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ment to trace their harasser's true identity.29 Additionally, changing the "archi-
tecture" of a Web site will further limit opportunities for cyberharassment.29" '
By changing the settings on Web sites to more private defaults, Web site op-
erators ensure better protection of their users from online harassment.2
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Internet continues to grow, both public safety concerns and the need
for regulations that discourage cyberharassment will become more prominent.
The Internet is dynamic. As the Internet evolves and progresses, a failure to
adopt cybercrime legislation now will lead to future violations of constitutional
rights. What follows is an unbalanced marketplace, where Internet and com-
munications companies are constantly rushing to meet the demand of their con-
sumers by creating new and innovative technologies.293 But the effect of trying
to meet these demands, without regulations in place, further contributes to the
threat to public safety and vulnerability of consumers to issues like cyberhar-
assment.
Megan Meier's suicide is one illustration of the tragic consequences that can
occur as a result of the unregulated dynamics of the Internet. This Comment,
however, does not suggest that the Internet should be regulated. Instead, it calls
for recognition by the Federal Government that cyberharassment poses a threat
to public safety and that laws prohibiting it are necessary to protect Internet
users. Whether and what balance is struck between freedom of speech and the
right to privacy will ultimately be determined by the courts. However, the best
interest of the public is served by the Federal Government providing a law that
addresses both values equally. It is time to enact federal legislation that com-
bats cyberharassment to promote a safe interactive environment for Americans
on the Internet.
290 See discussion supra Part IB.1. But see Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box:
Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Prob-
lems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 991, 1026 (2004)
(discussing anonymity as a means for protecting privacy and proposing "one-time identities
that cannot be traced back to their actual selves").
291 For example, a social networking Web site has control over the default privacy set-
tings for its users. On MySpace, the default privacy setting for its users is set so that any-
body can view another person's profile. SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 200-01.
292 Id. at 201.
293 Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet
Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 84 (2004), http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/
Articles/04_STLR_2/index.htm.
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